BY FAITH AND FAITH ALONE: MISSIONARIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND RELIGION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING IMPERIUM

Father Morosini, by all estimations, was a rather modest and gentle sort of man. He could bear the fact that locals called him an Austrian, instead referring to him properly as an Italian.[1] He could bear the fact that under the laws of the land he wasn't allowed into their homes to baptize newborns, or traverse his new home of Crete without a permit.[2] He could even bear the sweltering summer heat, the incessant chirping of crickets, and the dust that only Cretans know, where it sticks to the roof of your mouth and then, never, ever leaves.[3] But then, at the pivotal moment in his most recent sermon, a member of the local garrison, waiting in the background and under orders from the *Bey* himself to be present at all of Morosini's public appearances, tripped, stumbled, and fell.[4] It did not help that the soldier had been carrying a large, wooden spear, the sort of spear that when it falls results in a loud, noisy, and disruptive clattering.[5] It did not help that the soldier was wearing his metal *dizcek* and *krug*.[6]

Though this incident is amusing to tell, the truth of the matter is that it was probably never addressed. After all, by the seventeenth century, the Ottoman imperium stretched from the deserts of Arabia to the mountains of Hungary, holding sovereign rule and ultimate political authority over huge swaths of diverse territories, many with proud histories of Christianity and

[1] Jačov, Marko. *Le Missioni Cattoliche Nei Balcani Durante La Guerra Di Candia (1645-1669).* Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1992.
[2] ibid.
[3] Taken from the author's personal experience of a long, long week in the Cretan foothills.
[4] Jačov, Marko. *Le Missioni Cattoliche.*
[5] ibid.
[6] ibid.

Judaism. Still, it remains significant; in many of these regions, as shall be shown, the presence of missionaries and religion itself served a crucial role in the dynamics of Ottoman statehood.

This paper shall therefore make several arguments, one to do with the interactions between missionaries, both Franciscan and others, and an imperial state, characterized by a struggle for control over the religious beliefs and practices of the imperium. Simultaneously, this paper will also be arguing for the general use of religion in studying imperia pre-industrialization, specifically citing Jewish case studies as well as Franciscan and other missionary examples. Finally, this paper will ground and tether its observations towards the modern-day with an analysis of religion and empire in modern, Orthodox-Russian context. As this paper is a broad investigation into religion as a whole, it refrains from chronological order.

First, I argue that no matter their order, background, or status as subjects within the empire, the missionaries not only represented but proved to be a nuanced socio-political force at once a boon, foe, and resource to an imperium in the middle of a generalized shift towards religious centralization and greater religious regulation. Already a common refrain among notable Ottomanists, the role of religion with Ottoman imperium has undergone several shifts, and by the seventeenth century was moving away from what Cemal Kafadar described as a state of 'metadoxy,' or lack of concern with any specific belief, and onward towards a greater concern with defining and enforcing a Sunni orthodoxy.[7] Later this movement would establish itself as the widely recognized Millet system that Christian Nationalists are fond of citing when approaching Ottoman discourse, even as historians such as Latif Tas point out, to do so would be ahistorical, seeing as Ottoman structure did not coalesce around even around the word itself until

[7] Cemal, Kafadar. *Between Two Worlds*. Univ of California Press, 8 May 1995.

1839.[8] Placed squarely in the middle of this transformation, not only would the missionaries of the seventeenth century clash with their flocks, the state, and with each other, but through their own means and actions serve as a multi-layered and dynamic force in localized and imperial contexts.

Second, I argue that this paper's chosen lenses of religion and religiosity, which for definitional purposes shall refer to the structural practice to which one subscribes to in public, can serve as an excellent framework to explore the frameworks of religiosity fundamental to understanding the multiple imperia of the pre-industrial period. Already bolstered by the observations of Ottomanists, this will be continuously discussed throughout. Therefore, the ultimate argument of this paper is carried from these two preliminary arguments, in chief, that religion, not economics, language, or ethnicity, remains the best methodological foundation for understanding imperium in a world pre-industrialization and separation of church and state. It is religion that is to be the chief analytical framework, and an exploration of religion, religiosity, and missionary work in Bosnia, will provide the foundation for this study, beginning with a drop of useful context.

The Balkans have a long and dynamic history. Ever since the days of the Byzantines, many, if not all, of its diverse peoples followed a branch of Christianity, and, following the split of the church into two branches in 1054, chose to remain stout Orthodox believers.[9] Nevertheless, as far back as the thirteenth century, sponsored in part by his Holiness the Pope, missionaries from the Catholic side of the Church had begun to proliferate in the region, coming

[8] Latif, Tas. "The Myth of the Ottoman "Millet" System: Its Treatment of Kurds and a Discussion of Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 21, no. 4, 2014, pp. 497–526.
[9] Timothy E, Gregory. *A History of Byzantium.* Malden, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, p. 3

from far afield as Germany and the Iberian peninsula.[10] Though at first their impact was limited in scope, by the fifteenth century Franciscan missionaries in particular had seen some success, expanding their size to some sixty monasteries in Bosnia; and from here would propagate and annunciate a resilient form of Catholicism across the Balkans.[11] Nestled in the high mountain valleys of Bosnia, the Bosnian remained a powerful force within Ottoman society, maintaining a twofold purpose and multiple directives. First, the Ottoman state, despite its powerful military apparatus, was often in need of an interlocutory network for tax-collection, critical in regions miles from Constantinople and the center of governance.[12] As noted by Toth, the missionaries, who served as the heads of local communities and parish preachers, would act as an ideal and unobtrusive method for fleecing local populations of their taxes.[13] Second, the Franciscans were aggressive Catholics, even in a time in which, in the words of historian Greyerz Kaspar, "Religion ... was a mirror for the mind."[14]

As such, their efforts to convert hardscrabble Orthodox peasants, already officially split by the events of 1054, and counter the rising Bogomillist 'heresy', were often met with chagrin, if not outright hostility.[15] This, too, served Ottoman interests, for, as historian Istvan Toth notes, "Bitter rancord among the non-Muslim populations reduced the likelihood of a united Christian uprising against Ottoman rule."[16]

---

[10] István, Tóth,. "Between Islam and Catholicism: Bosnian Franciscan Missionaries in Turkish Hungary, 1584-1716." *The Catholic Historical Review*, vol. 89, no. 3, 2003, pp. 409–433.
[11] ibid. p. 410
[12] ibid.
[13] ibid.
[14] Greyerz, Kaspar. *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800*. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.
[15] István, Tóth. "Between Islam and Catholicism." A quick note on the Bogomilists: Differentiated from the "Orthodox" population by their rejection of traditional ecclesiastical authority, the dualist sect was founded in 1054 and were considered heretical by both Catholicism and by the Patriarchs of Constantinople.
[16] ibid., p. 411

At the same time, it was not for nothing that Franciscan across the Balkans were handed special rights and privileges which further ensured them as separate subjects and distinct within the imperium. These included, but were not limited to: the right to carry arms, the right to own and restore churches, rights to local mines, exemption from tax, and to be protected from harassment by Orthodox bishops.[17] Protected by their rights and privileges, the Franciscans would even go as far as rejecting the ecclesiastical stipulations set down by the Council of Trent, and then refuse to reorganize the structure of their churches when called to do so by the Papacy.[18] These examples demonstrate that the Franciscans benefited from the Porte's policies and mandates that incorporated them within the empire's administrative structures and gave them preferential treatment. For instance, when threatened, one doubtful and audacious friar could even accuse his fellow Christians on the other side of the Danube of being Habsburgian political agents, all from a position of relative safety. [19]

In turn the missionaries reinforced a reliance on strict rules and procedure, even when the matter concerned other Christians. For example, in 1628, the lay, Catholic, and Serbian Simone Matković reported that the Franciscan had refused to let him celebrate the mass in the chapel of Belgrade.[20] He became even more infuriated when a Franciscan s had removed the candles that Matković had put on the altar the night previous.[21] The subsequent justification of their behavior, in which the Franciscan claimed that they alone had exclusive rights to provide such services,

[17] Emese, Muntan. "Between Rome and Constantinople: Franciscan Friars in Medieval and Ottoman Bosnia (13th-17th Centuries)." New Approaches towards a Comparative History of Religious Communities. Contributions from Eastern and Central Europe, FOVOG Workshop at Technische Universität Dresden, 22-23 November, 2016., p. 9
[18] ibid., p. 11.
[19] ibid., p. 11
[20] Emese, Mutan. "Uneasy Agents of Tridentine Reforms: Catholic Missionaries in Southern Ottoman Hungary and Their Local Competitors in the Early Seventeenth Century." Journal of Early Modern Christianity, vol. 7, no. 1, 22020, p. 151-175
[21] ibid., p. 159

was crucially given to them through a written affidavit by the Ottoman, and therefore by extension Sunni governor and *pasha* of Buda.[22]

Other oddities of Franciscan identity, too, wormed their way into secular practice and the background of imperial life. In 1650, a priest by the name of Pietro Sabbatini noted that the "Franciscans refuse to officiate weddings", choosing to hand out booklets that would serve as testimony that the couple had, in fact, been married instead.[23] This, historian Emese Muntán describes, was a "custom that had allegedly been practiced by the Franciscans before the arrival of the [other] Catholics."[24]

And yet, as subjects of the imperium, the Franciscans faced an equal and considerable amount of pressure. Almost all available accounts of the Franciscans describe their lives being as under, or beneath, the "Ottoman yoke."[25] If a Franciscan wished to travel from region to region, this required a special permit and express permission from a local bey, who in practice would be a Sunni.[26] Or, depending on the severity and asceticism to which he practiced, a Franciscan might not be allowed in Sunni household or face harsh punishments upon looking a Sunni woman in the eye.[27] While these cultural restrictions do provide interesting insights into the potential prohibitions placed by an empire on its subjects, Franciscan in particular faced heavier restrictions than even these. Not only were Franciscans stripped of their control over burial practices, it seemed as if almost any matter of religious practice could be subject to Ottoman

[22] ibid., p. 159
[23] Emese, Mutan. "Between Rome and Constantinople," p., 15
[24] ibid., p. 15
[25] István, Tóth. *Missionaries' letters from Hungary and Transylvania.* Osiris Publishing, Budapest, 2004. p. 22
[26] Emese, Muntan.. "Between Rome and Constantinople," p., 27
[27] ibid., p. 27

scrutiny, ranging from the right to preach to the concepts discussed within the sermon itself, with oft oppressive nature of imperium making itself self-evident.[28]

However, as telling as the firmness of both Ottoman governance and Franciscan Catholicism can be, there were many missionaries who traveled to the Balkans encountered religions that were in their eyes neither Orthodox nor Catholic at all. Missionary Cherubino da Val di Bono put it best after a visit to Albania, noting that as Catholics of his parish lived together with Muslims, his charges were "learning many things from the unfaithful," or, "molte cose imparano dalli infede".[29] Such practices mixed religious and social practices and beliefs, ranging in the belief of both Christians and Muslims in "infinite superstitions" such as the evil eye, to a resilient belief in the curing power of the prayers uttered by imams.[30] Even worse in Bono's eyes was his parish's belief that Islamic prayers and rituals outweighed his Catholic ones.[31] And last, to end an ironic note of frustration, Bono discovered his sermons on the righteousness of poverty were not being met with the intended effect. According to his parish, God blessed only the rich, and did not answer for the poor.[32] This amusing information, when taken with the other missionaries' commentaries, illuminates and provides a steady counterpoint to the notion of imperium as easily understood through a single religious interpretation, or even understood through a single, prevalent identity. Through their criticism other missionaries were cognizant of this point as well. Writes one: "They are only Christians in name, but not in deeds,

[28] ibid., p. 27
[29] *Relacione mbi gjendjen e Shqipërisë veriore e të mesme në shekullin XVII 1,* quoted in Rafael, Chelaru. "Between Coexistence and Assimilation-Catholic Identity and Islam in W. Balkans 17th-18th C." Revista Istorică, vol. 23, no. 3-4, 2012, p.301
[30] ibid. p. 301
[31] Rafael, Chelaru. "Between Coexistence and Assimilation-Catholic Identity and Islam in W. Balkans 17th-18th C." Revista Istorică, vol. 23, no. 3-4, 2012, p.302
[32] ibid., 302

for being libertines, thieves and murderers."[33] Even with its ethnic and religious bigotry considered, this evidence demonstrates once again the proven usefulness of missionary work towards historical understandings of day to day to life in an empire, even one overseen by a differing religious prerogative.

To further add to this complexity, the works of missionaries expanded into lands beyond the Balkans as time progressed and Ottoman conquests continued. Take, for example, the once Hungarian crownlands, which for a large portion of the seventeenth century lay under Ottoman control. Here, and much to their dismay, Franciscans encountered numerous opponents. Not only, notes historian Antal Molnar, did the Franciscans have to contend with a firm and established opponent in the form of Jesuit Catholics eager to claim authority over Hungary's cities, but they had arrived rather late, only beginning to enter in the 1640's, while their rivals had already established existing connections far back as 1612.[34] They also faced a resilient force in the form of Hungary's large Orthodox and growing Protestant population, mocked by the Austrians for being, in the words of one writer: "Nothing more than cross-carrying Turks."[35]

Here, no matter their order, the Franciscans encountered serious resistance, and records are somewhat scarcer. As such, this paper will shift from a focus on the Franciscans to the Jesuits, with religion still underlying every interaction. Language, for instance, served neither the Hungarians nor the Jesuits in their relations to the other. As historian Paul Shore notes, prospective conversions remained rare, as most Jesuit brothers were uneducated and unversed in

---

[33] *Letters of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith at Rome O Srbima, Vol. I,* quoted in Rafael, Chelaru. "Between Coexistence and Assimilation-Catholic Identity and Islam in W. Balkans 17th-18th C." Revista Istorică, vol. 23, no. 3-4, 2012, p. 303

[34] Antal, Molnár,. "Struggle for the Chapel of Belgrade (1612—1643). Trade and Catholic Church in Ottoman Hungary." *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, vol. 60, no. 1, 2007, p., 73

[35] Joseph, Lancaster. "The Turkish Century | from Hittites to Atatürk." Www.youtube.com, 26 Mar. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgjiJHV8P0w&t=2416s.

"Hungarian or Slavonic languages," and "the records… indicate there were many such priests."[36] Even in the cases of the most successful of Jesuit brothers, such as the Jesuit-aligned Bishop of Mukacheve, he, too, spoke neither Ruthenian or Hungarian.[37] As such, the evidence shows that language fails to provide insight into missionary life, and by extension missionary life under imperium in any significant way, further reinforcing religion as the primary arbiter of navigation for pre-industrial empire.

In the smaller villages of Carpathian Basin, too, the urbanite-minded Jesuits faced simmering tensions with imperial subjects that can be only understood through a religious schematic. For instance, in efforts that could be understood as pragmatic problem-solving, prospective students who wished to become Jesuits were compelled for several years to share lodgings "at great inconvenience" to their Rectors.[38] What is critical here is not only the way in which this was seen by established Jesuits, one of whom wrote the aforementioned quote, but the isolation of the converts themselves, further removed from their known worlds of Orthodox and Protestant networks, and in some cases, even discriminated against by those communities.[39] The effect was a distinct sense of religious intolerance from Jesuit rectors and the Protestant populace, with one newly entered Jesuit describing himself "as solitary as a turtle dove."[40] Such evidence shows that religion might be a way of interrogating and reconstructing the emotional lives of persons under an empire, beyond historical truths.

---

[36] Paul, Shore. "The Life and Death of a Jesuit Mission: The Collegium in Uzhgorod, Transcarpathia (1650-1773)." The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 86, no. 4, 1 Oct. 2008, p., 607
[37] ibid., p., 614
[38] *Istoria Collegii Homoniensis-Ungvarisenis Societatis Iesv Praecipue ab anno 1700 in usum collecta,* quoted in Paul, Shore. "The Life and Death of a Jesuit Mission: The Collegium in Uzhgorod, Transcarpathia (1650-1773), p. 609
[39] ibid, p. 610
[40] ibid., p. 610

In addition, just as in the Balkans, differences of opinion between Jesuit missionaries and established practitioners add to a sense of complicated religiosity within imperium. As historian Emese Muntán has summarized, "The Orthodox…[knew] only how to make the sign of the cross; however, they insisted that the crossing should not start from the left side…in contradistinction to the Catholic practice."[41] Such practices, as Jesuit missionary Istvan Szini reports, could deteriorate further unless quickly rectified. In one notable memo he decried the region of Timișoara, where around "30 villages of Wallachians" present in the region underwent a public conversion "to all the sects of the schismatics," renouncing Jesuit preachings all together.[42] Further still, these villages went on to form their own spiritual community of distinct esoteric practice.[43] Not only does this evidence support the notion that religion be made the dominant vehicle for understanding what may otherwise be understood as practical decisions in an early modern imperium, and as such gain significant strength; but on the whole bolsters the prevalence of shared religious commitment and role of religion within pre-modern imperial nature and character.

Elsewhere in Ottoman Hungary, one can see as much dissatisfaction with Jesuit presence, and thus infer the importance of religion in resistance to outsider influence as imperium expanded, even efforts sanctioned by said imperium. Further still, though the missionaries would write extensive treatises on the "sono tutti infetti degli errori della seta greca," or the errors of the "Greek Sect," the newfound and rapid spreading faiths of Protestantism and Calvinsim also appear in plenty, proffering themselves as multilayered angles to explore relations between new religious movements and pre-established religiosity.[44] This would very much prove true, as

[41] Emese, Muntan. "Uneasy Agents of Tridentine Reforms."
[42] Mihály, Balázs. *Jesuit missions in Transylvania and occupation: 1617-1625.* Scriptum, 1990.
[43] ibid.
[44] ibid.

historian Graeme Murdock would note, writing: "By the latter decades of the sixteenth century confessional division in…Hungary was a social reality," while also noting that large portions of Hungarians "remained loyal to one of the Protestant churches" until the mid-seventeenth century.[45] The report of the Bishop of Prizren, Petar Katić, during a visit to the Hungarian countryside, demonstrates the lengths to which Hungarians enmeshed themselves within the "heretic" Protestantism, with "many" people of the rural villages undergoing conversion.[46] Reinforcing and bolstering this paper's overall arguments, this in turn forced him to rely on both a *ferman,* a sultanic decree of Islamic bearing, and a legal religious certificate, or *hüccet,* to convince the local Protestants of his papal authority and his right to preach.[47]

Another piece of the two main arguments and underlying insights of this paper lies within the curious role missionaries played in state experimentation, and on the island of Crete, which following a victorious war with Venice in 1646 was new Ottoman territory. [48] Here missionaries were allowed to come in droves, as historian Evgenia Kermeli observes, there was a "a rush of missionaries previously barred from entering the territory due to the conflicts between Venice and the Pope in Italy.[49] In addition, as the aforementioned 'metadoxy' was gaining momentum, Kermeli notes a desire to "change the interpretation of Ḥanafī law…[with]...eminent jurisconsults endeavoring to reconcile Ottoman law, *kanun,* with Islamic law, *şeriat."*[50] Kermeli goes on to note that while the missionaries shared the same desires for change, these were for different reasons, as both "the missionaries and Ottoman jurists believed Islam needed to

[45] Graeme, Murdock. *Calvinism on the Frontier, 1600-1660*. Clarendon Press, 3 Aug. 2000. p., 22
[46] Mihály, Balázs.. *Jesuit missions*
[47] Ana, Sekulić. "From a Legal Proof to a Historical Fact: Trajectories of an Ottoman Document in a Franciscan Monastery, Sixteenth to Twentieth Century." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 62, no. 5/6, 2019, p. 925
[48] Eugenia, Kermeli. "Marriage and Divorce of Christians and New Muslims in Early Modern Ottoman Empire: Crete 1645-1670." Oriente Moderno, vol. 93, no. 2, 2013, p.530
[49] ibid.
[50] ibid.

change…For the orders, it was hoped the changes might bring new converts, and for the jurists it was necessary."[51] Nevertheless, both the Catholic orders and the Ottoman authorities were open to experimentation. Notions deemed feasible to change included the legal age to accept Islam, and therefore to be considered as a functioning adult.[52] Here a Dominican missionary played a key role as he helped a woman articulate a petition for a court case.[53] According to his report, the woman claimed that a Sunni military officer by the name of Mehmetthe Sipahi had been allowed to take her daughter's hand in marriage, who by Orthodox standards was underage.[54] The woman, Maryete of Kasteli, claimed the girl could not serve as his Mehmetthe's wife, and that her daughter "is underage. I am her legal guardian and I do not consent to this marriage."[55] Crucially, when the case was put forward to *Kadi* of Resmr, on the nineteenth of December, 1651, the initial redress was attended and permitted by a Franciscan missionary.[56] This seems to have the intended effect; when Maryeta's case was dismissed, it reached the ears of the Sultan, who would go on to personally order the local commander to appoint another missionary to be responsible for the progress of the court case, as well as a new judge to address the ruling.[57]

With the same mentality, other religious and social customs on the island were experimented upon, always with Catholic missionaries present as extra-religious authorities. For instance, on the fourteenth of April 1671, a Christian resident in Kandiye, one Ergina, daughter of Yanis, sold to her newly Muslim husband Mustafa Bese a grove of twenty-five olive trees, overseen by a Dominican friar.[58] As this practice fell into contradiction with *Hanafi* law, which

[51] ibid.
[52] ibid.
[53] ibid.
[54] ibid.
[55] ibid.
[56] ibid.
[57] ibid.
[58] ibid.

stipulates that Islamic partners must exchange gifts in a mutual process, the case was brought to court two days later on fourteenth of April of 1671, where the same Dominican argued in the couple's favor.[59]

Elsewhere, the missionaries could also prove a critical actor in wrestling political power away from already-powerful institutions the Ottomans held less authority over, and doubly so within the Orthodox structures. In particular, As the missionaries ensconced themselves in and participated with Orthodox networks, they themselves gave the Ottoman sultanates not only a way to experiment with changes but enforce them without stirring the metaphorical hornet's nest.

For instance, take the case of the Gate of the Holy Sepulchre in the Patriarch in Jerusalem. Following the establishment of a Franciscan mission in the city in 1682, the Franciscans were handed the rights to the great gate of the Holy Sepulchre, deemed a new political force in a city long-overseen by an Orthodox patriarch.[60] Not only did the Franciscans bar the non-Catholic Christian communities from using it, redirecting the ire of the Patriarch away from the empire and towards themselves, missionaries who took care of the gate were given exemption from *Cizye,* a practice which had not been extended to the Orthodox monks when they had cared for it previously.[61] This resentment was echoed by the populace, once sullen towards Ottoman Authorities. A letter from the Armenian quarter of the city in 1697, for instance, complained at length about the Catholic missionaries who, rather than direct their anger at Ottoman imperium, complained voraciously over "Their humiliation at the hands of the missionaries."[62]

---

[59] ibid.

[60] Hasan, Colak. *Relations between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria: 16th-18th Centuries.* University of Birmingham, 2012.

[61] Tijana Krstić. *Entangled Confessionalizations?* Gorgias Press, 2022.

[62] ibid.

Elsewhere, hostile political agents could be subverted. In Aleppo, a radical Orthodox priest by the name of Avedik was known for calling for the empire's dissolution, as well as his fierce anti-Catholic policies.[63] Seeing an opportunity to slay two birds with one stone, Franciscans missionaries were allowed by Sultanic decree in 1638.[64] Spurred by Avedik's rhetoric, the missionaries took matters into their own hands, had him deposed, and then exiled to the island Chios.[65] They also bribed the person who was taking him to Chios, and with the help of the French consul, took Avedik all the way to France to imprison him in the Bastille.[66] Not only did this diminish Orthodox authority in the city, writes historian Hasan Colak, this ultimately weakened the Franciscan's position as well, causing the city's residents to respond more openly to Islam.[67]

Last of all, even though this was not as well established in the seventeenth century as opposed to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, missionaries served a diplomatic function. As Cosack notes, "European religious policies in the Levant focused on protecting the Holy Land, a task which was transferred to the French King in 1604, and protecting the Catholic missionaries, upon whom by the terms of the French capitulations of 1673, the Ottomans granted the freedom to exercise their functions 'as they used to be."[68] The missionaries therefore could serve as a crowbar for other states beyond the imperium to interfere within the imperium. Furthermore, just as was the case in Aleppo, the missionaries could act on behalf of their home states. For instance, when the case was made for Kyrillo Loukaris, the patriarch of Constantinople who advocated for a ban on English shipping to be executed, the Catholic party, mostly represented by British

---

[63] Hasan, Colak. *Relations between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates.*
[64] ibid.
[65] Tijana Krstić. *Entangled Confessionalizations?*
[66] Hasan, Colak. Relations between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates.
[67] ibid.
[68] ibid.

Franciscans in Istanbul, worked hard to have him hanged.[69] They succeeded, and had the patriarch killed later that year 1638.[70]

Even in cases where missionary activities were markedly absent, such as in the Hebrew enclaves and urbanite communities, religion remained a key fractal in the pre-industrial landscape. This is perhaps best illustrated by the city of Salonica, or modern-day Thessaloniki. As will be shown, studying such communities provides insights into the social fabric of wider imperial tendencies, and not just ones of a religious leaning.

Though Salonica was home to a large number of Orthodox Greeks, the Jewish history of the city stretches back to 1492, and by the mid-seventeenth century the city had evolved into hosting a specialized, proactive, and educated Jewish identity.[71] These would take the form of twenty-nine self-representing organizations referred to as *Kehalim*, with these serving as their own educational facilities, centers of judicial authority, and public charities.[72] Notably, the *Kehalim* remained for all practical observation outside the realms of Ottoman influence and authority, and one in the words of one Jew, each *Kehalim* was "a city unto itself."[73] In addition, though diverse in their own regard, with each Kehalim founded by Jews of various practices ranging from Romaniote to Sephardic and Ashkenazi, commonality in creed laid the groundwork for conference with Ottoman authorities. This is perhaps evidenced by the creation of a *kolel de la sivdad*, or city-wide collective, in the latter half of 1680, for the city and the province's Ottoman pasha to better collaborate .[74] This shows that the same facets of imperium that arose

[69] ibid.
[70] ibid.
[71] Devin, E. Naar. "The 'Mother of Israel' or the 'Sephardi Metropolis'? Sephardim, Ashkenazim, and Romaniotes in Salonica." *Jewish Social Studies* 22, no. 1 (2016), p. 83
[72] ibid., p. 83
[73] Yaron, BenNaeh. *Jews in the Realm of the Sultans: Ottoman Jewish Society in the Seventeenth Century (Tübingen, 2008)*, quoted in Devin, E. Naar. "The 'Mother of Israel' or the 'Sephardi Metropolis'? Sephardim, Ashkenazim, and Romaniotes in Salonica." Jewish Social Studies 22, no. 1 (2016), p. 86
[74] Devin, Naar. "The "Mother of Israel," p. 86

through the study of missionaries reinforce themselves even without missionaries to illustrate them. Just as Ottoman authorities might restrict and prohibit, they once again allow and permit if deemed necessary.

In addition, as posited by historian Halil İnalcık, professions and religious identity under Ottoman rule had a broad tendency to be linked throughout economic spheres, and Jewish identity, and in particular in Thessaloniki, Jewish economic identity, began to coalesce around several distinctive professions.[75] Unlike missionaries and friars, whose economic power might be stymied by the poverty of their respective areas, Thessalonian Jews in particular grew to be associated with sturdy ships, cunning merchants, and beautiful tapestries, being perceived as master shipbuilders, weavers, and economic assets.[76] To further this association, certain styles of clothing, symbolism, and markings on buildings were all permitted, if not encouraged by the *Kehalim.* Shipbuilders in particular wore marks of rank on their shoulders and leftmost breast, while merchants of rare spices could be identified through the vermillion detailing on the entrance to their shops.[77] This evidence further demonstrates that in pre-modern imperium, and perhaps in all imperium, one's economic profession weaves itself into other facets of one's identity, not only encouraging the historian to study religion as economics, and by extension, religions as the economics of and within imperial networks, but even the study of social realities such as clothing and dress.

Moving away from Thessaloniki and towards the wider realms of the empire, where Judaism faced heavier discrimination, imperial efforts at discrimination could even be regarded with considerable favor, given to the comparisons by those of the time to the treatment of Jews in

[75] Halil Inalcik, and Suraiya Faroqhi. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300-1600.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[76] Devin, Naar. "The "Mother of Israel," p. 86
[77] ibid., p. 76

European lands and kingdoms, where pogroms might occur with abhorrent frequency. Not for nothing did Jewish scholar Samuel Usque of Ottoman Anatolia write in the sixteenth century: "Here the gates of liberty are always wide open for you that you may fully practice your Judaism; they are never closed."[78]

Such was the case in Ottoman Crimea after the Ottoman annexation of large swathes of the region in 1475; pre-existing Karaite and Rabbanite communities regarded the matter as a positive change.[79] Oppressive measures from Tatar authorities had been part of state practice, and Khans were not unwilling to abuse their Jewish subjects. According to an affidavit written by one Karaite pilgrim preparing for a journey to Jerusalem, all the money he had collected for the long and difficult journey was taken by Crimean authorities, in as arbitrary a manner as possible.[80] He would not receive any explanation, or justification.[81] His only answer was that the Khan willed it.[82] Then, to add further insult to his understandable upset, he was punished even further, thrown into the dungeons of Bahcresray and clapped with a chain around his neck.[83] As there remains no given explanation for the Khan's actions, and there remains no record of the stolen money being used, it is not unreasonable to conclude this was in of itself a religious matter, caused by religious differences, and that these sort of imperial decisions demonstrate the way in which religion can factor into even arbitrary governance.

Once again, religion and religiosity in the Crimea proves critical to historians' definitions of categories, crucial in understanding a multi-ethnic empire. To quote historian Mikhail Kizilov,

---

[78] Samuel Usque. *Consolation for the Tribulations of Israel*, quoted in Devin, Naar. "The Mother of Israel."
[79] Kizilov, Mikhail. "Between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans. The Karaite and Rabbanite Jews of the Crimea in Early Modern Times." *Perspectives on the History of Karaism*, edited by Guillaume Dye, Brussels, Éditions De l'Université De Bruxelles, 2021, p. 235
[80] ibid., p. 237
[81] ibid. p. 237
[82] ibid., p.242
[83] ibid., p. 242

"both types of Crimean Jews soon became culturally Turkicized, and started speaking dialects (or, rather, ethnolects) of the Crimean Tatar and Ottoman Turkish languages"[84] and "their everyday customs and traditional dress were also almost identical with those of the Crimean Tatars."[85] Thus religion not only serves as a framework with which to explore Crimean Jews and their relations to the Ottoman governance, it soon becomes the only viable framework with serious potential.

Furthermore, religion can be utilized to understand personal decisions and actions inside imperial frameworks and society, and in particular the nature of religious conversion as sanctioned by said imperium. Take the instance of Leah of Constantinople, who in 1654 was married in a public, organized ceremony to the Karaite Abraham o Mangup by Ottoman authorities.[86] In the days either prior or before the marriage, she underwent a distinct process of conversion to Karaitism, as what records are available call her a *ha-giyyoret,* or a "converted one."[87] Though the records do not state her previous religion, and there is a high probability that Leah was not a Muslim, the fact that Ottoman authorities sponsored such a publicized transition does bring to light the lengths that imperium is sometimes willing to take to preserve social cohesion. In addition, with secretive conversions remaining possible, as a seventeenth-century sharia record mentioning a Karaite with the name "Teleş Dede bin Mehmed" seems to suggest, social insights into imperium beyond typical sources may appear in tantalizing glimpses with the application of a religious-minded framework.[88]

---

[84] ibid., p. 235
[85] ibid., p. 236
[86] ibid., 252
[87] ibid., 252
[88] ibid., 252

And now for the conclusions, beginning with the conclusions drawn from the examples given and then followed by discussions of wider conclusions drawn upon imperium itself. The missionaries *were* enmeshed in localized and imperial networks. The missionaries *were* a dynamic force in almost any region they served, and they *were* seen as enemies, gifts, and resources. Being semi-independent actors in their own sovereign right, missionaries struggled not only with each other but with the state; not to mention their difficult task of converting local populations. At times, one can see a clear intent by the Ottoman empire to use the missionaries for the religious health of the imperium, and, at times, one can see the missionaries willingly interact with the state, or at the very least, gain and uphold special rights and privileges. At times, the struggles played directly into Ottoman interests, and, at times, were marred by suspicion and restriction.

Missionary work also provides direct access to what this paper has argued to be the most prudent framework for analyzing pre-industrial imperium and imperium in general. Several conclusions present themselves:

One: for understanding pre-industrial imperium, religion remains a historian's best asset. Most of the frameworks put forth by historiography encounter localized difficulties, while attempts to understand the empire by its institutions must reckon with the fact that religion underpins those institutions. Attempts to understand the empire through language or ethnic identity must reckon with a religious character that disproves their value or subsumes and transforms them completely. Understanding the empire through an economic lens does not prove to be a viable interrogative framework, as it must recognize the role of religion at its side, for as demonstrated, such interrogations run the risk of ignoring clear and evident connections. Lastly, even the more agreeable social constructions such as loyalties, personal decisions, naming

decisions, actions of governance, tolerance of outsiders, and discrimination of outsiders, to name a considerable few, all benefit from being understood from a religious perspective. Given the failures and limitations of other frameworks, this paper concludes that across the Ottoman imperium, and without much debate, religion served and was understood as the primary fulcrum and nexus of interactions, imperial action, and life underneath the empire.

Two:the sheer presence of such a fulcrum's existence may in turn lead to more meaningful and less discussed conclusions about imperium and empires. As evidenced by the tendency of Ottoman, and therefore imperial, authorities, to allow, sponsor, and dedicate resources towards the rights of its subjects and their own resilient identities, it is not unreasonable to conclude that all empires are concerned with one thing: self-preservation. These practices can range from religious tolerance, as experienced by the Jews of Crimea, to restrictions placed on their subjects, such as in the case of Bosnian Franciscans. This this principle is encapsulated in the many small pieces of evidence raised by this paper, such as the marriage permission granted to Leah of Constantinople, the forming of *kolel de la sivdad* in Salonica, and the efforts taken to sponsor missionary work in Aleppo and Jerusalem.

Three:an empire will outsource its imperial duties, be they logistical or bureaucratic, for easy, definitive solutions that itself cannot provide and maintain. If necessary, an empire will implement a policy of divide and control, either allowing or encouraging outside forces such as missionaries to interfere in newly conquered regions, or sowing division, to counter threats and obstacles. Last, though this may vary in quality and character, an empire must be willing to observe, delineate, and interfere in regions and networks wherever such action might be permitted. Just as the human beings it controls are resources in of themselves, the customs, and

religions it oversees are internal resources, and as such must be managed for the good of the state.

Why does this matter? Simply because the future is unknowable, and time is never circular. What has proven true may prove itself true again, especially if one broadens the definition of religion and imperium.

Consider, for instance, the current situation of Russian Orthodoxy in modern Russia under Putin's regime. Under the dictatorship of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, religion plays a large and heavy role in governance, political theory, and the lives of the average Russian citizen. Unlike societies where religion does not play a large role in state construction, or where religious pluralism acts as a counterbalance to rising religious nationalism, religiosity, nationalism, in modern Russia the old notions of empire are explicitly linked and solidified.

For instance, historian John Anderson notes that "Putin tends to be seen as a conservative, keen to promote a sense of patriotism and traditional moral values," and evidences his 2000 Christmas address to Orthodox believers for the need for a "spiritual and moral rebirth of the Fatherland," drawing a connection—if not between Orthodoxy as a framework for understanding modern Russian expansion, then at least then between Putin's own understandings of religion, or his efforts to expand his dictatorial "empire".[89] It is also worth noting that Putin is rumored to never remove two items: one, his high-end, high-value watch, and second, his personal cross. [90]

At the same time, examples of Putin's religious nature can be seen in actions beyond the scope of Putin himself. In the years leading up to the war in Ukraine and the annexation of

[89] John, Anderson, . "Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?" *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 1, 2007, pp. 185–201.
[90] ibid.

Crimea, Putin's links to the Orthodox Church grew and grew. According to Anderson, he grew close to Archimandrite Tikhon, the head of Moscow's Presentation monastery, hosted the Patriarch of the church at his *Dacha,* and sponsored efforts to propagate Russian Orthodoxy within Ukraine.[91] The church returned the favor and has had Putin declared an outright messianic figure, a 'child' of God, incapable of mortal sins.[92] By modern Russian philosophers, schooled in Eurasianism, he is seen as a man "beyond humanity" in the age of "needed heroes, outsized characters from beyond history, capable of willing themselves to power." [93] Putin and Russian policy have lost the semblance of pragmatic observation of Orthodox policy through their actions, fully leaning into religious notions of imperial expansion.[94]

To reinforce this theme and historical understandings of religion as means of understanding the Russian imperium, a spell of laws and ordinances geared towards religious tolerance in a new and redefined Russia were passed following 1997.[95] As the laws were passed, in an almost laughable fashion, the language of the laws and discourse around them framed the religious security of Russia as threatened, specifically threatened by, to quote, "hordes of missionaries," and that that these foreign actors and/or missionaries were actually covert foreign intelligence workers, gathering information about "Russian policies and strategic activities."[96] This is not a one-off example, either. As outside observers Wallace Daniel and Christopher Marsh state, "Unless the government affirmed Russia's traditional faiths against the aggressive actions of other religious groups and sects, the patriarch [Alexey II] maintained the renewal of

[91] ibid.
[92] Kirill, I. "The Norm of Faith as a Norm of Life." Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 Feb. 2000.
[93] Ivan, Ilyin, A. On Resistance to Evil by Force. Zvolen, Slovakia: Taxiarch Press, 2018.
[94] John, Anderson, . "Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?"
[95] Daniel P,Payne, . "Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?" Journal of Church and State, vol. 52, no. 4, 2010, pp. 712–727.
[96] ibid., p. 714

Russia's own spiritual traditions stood little chance."[97] Even more telling, a similar argument made by the head of the religious studies faculty at the Russian Academy of State Service, Nikolai Trofimchuk, in his book *Expansiya,* posits that foreign "missionaries", regardless of their intentions, "served the interests of the countries from which they came"[98] and last draws special attention to the concept of "Russian spiritual security," a common refrain among Russian elites.[99]

This rhetoric echoes the atmosphere found within a serious religious study of Ottoman imperium. Just as in the Ottoman empire, religion is understood as pivotal and missionaries seen as enemies; though time has passed, there are numerous examples of religion being levied, understood, restricted, and recognized in just the same way as before. Even states that may no longer fit the historical definition of an empire may use religion as the primary driver behind their internal assessment of the state, or even their geopolitical decisions.

This theory is further evidenced by Putin's and the Russian military's growing obsession with pre-soviet Russian thinkers such as Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin. Ilyin, the progenitor of a proto-Fascist, Neo-Orthodox Russian philosophy, has been regularly quoted in Russian thought, with his works cited by the head of the constitutional court, by patriarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and by the head of the foreign ministry.[100] Putin, too, quotes Ilyn in speech after speech after speech. The world has lost its "divine totality" and "harmonious unity," so Ukraine needed to be invaded.[101] Only Russia has somehow escaped the evil of "history" or "the fragmentation of human existence."[102] Because it "[draws] the strength of its soul from God," it

[97] Daniel P, Payne. "Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry."
[98] ibid.
[99] ibid.
[100] ibid.
[101] Ivan, Ilyin, A. *On Resistance to Evil by Force.*
[102] ibid.

remains under perpetual attack from the rest of the malevolent world.[103] No wrongdoing is possible in Russia, as its immaculate essence had endured "a millennium of suffering."[104] This Russia is not a country with individuals and institutions but an immortal creature, a "living organic unity."[105]

Now that it is has been proven that religion played a predominant role, if not *the* predominant role in the world of pre-industrial imperium, and in certain cases, may again play a role in a modern state likened to an empire, might it possible for religion to re-assume and guide decisions as it has done in the past? After all, it is only in recent centuries that any separation of church and state has been tolerated, and in many parts of the world, the concept remains separated and estranged from local realities. The Caliphate was only abolished on the third of March, 1924.[106] Secularization in India was only achieved in 1947, facing stiff resistance from all sides, ranging from conservative Buddhists, outraged Muslims, and nationalistic Hindus.[107] Nearby Pakistan has abandoned the practice of secularism in its entirety, with founders such as Shabbir Ahmad Usmani leading the country towards an explicit religious state.[108] Of the theocracy of Iran, perhaps the most fanatical of all religious states, there shall be no mention save for a reference to the Revolutionary Guard, a "state within a state" and tasked with crushing with anyone, or anything, that might cause harm to the never-ending Islamic Revolution.[109]

Religion, even in an arguably modern and secular landscape such as the United States of America, where church attendance has decreased by fifty percent, still plays a role in its citizens'

[103] ibid.
[104] ibid.
[105] Jörge Rüpke. *Religion and Its History.* Routledge, 9 May 2021.
[106] ibid.
[107] ibid.
[108] ibid.
[109] David, Gritten. "Iran Executes Two Men Convicted of Blasphemy." BBC News, 8 May 2023,

lives, and, by extension, how those citizens will be viewed by the historical actors of the future.[110] Not for nothing did more than a quarter million pilgrims walk the Camino de Santiago in Spain in 2019.[111] This in turn leads to more questions: is it possible that in the seeds of time another empire might rise, and ground itself in religious schematics as so many nations, empires, and governments have done?

This development in Russia is a travesty and has already in this author's lifetime played a not insignificant role in the instigation of a cruel and unjust war aimed at stripping away the rights of a sovereign people, and it remains thoroughly entangled with religion. Consider this quote made by Putin himself, speaking of "spiritual" brotherhood in *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,* which I will leave in its entirety: "Our spiritual unity has also been attacked. As in the days of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a new ecclesiastical has been initiated. The secular authorities, making no secret of their political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split, to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They have to destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs."[112]

How can an author who claims to be religious and spiritual square his love for religion and the cruelties performed in its name? As a purveyor of the old, the truly old, as a poet who quotes Vishnu, as a historian scanning, with his own two eyes, the sacred illustrations in the Book of Kells; as a man, pacing Goucher's campus and at once the same ground that Buddha walked, where is his faith that moves the mountain? Where is the faith that turns men to good?

---

[110] Jörge Rüpke. *Religion and Its History.*
[111] ibid.
[112] Vladimir, Putin. On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. July 12, 2021. Speech.

This is, in the end, not to imply that religion is in of itself, *good,* merely that faith can drive men to *good,* which one supposes that Father Morosini, first mentioned some twenty-five pages ago, must have felt, even as he labored away on a dusty island, being mocked by peasants and far from the warm hills of Italy. But the stories of the fathers who traveled to spread the Word are surprisingly difficult to pull out; and even in a thousand-page document of clerical records such personal and intimate stories, and especially ones which might be relevant, are few and far between. It was only through luck and chance that Morosini's story appears in this paper at all; found the night after the initial draft chunk was due, nestled in between a routine report on an Orthodox Patriarch and a letter concerning a nearby scandal.[113] Worse yet, he is never mentioned again.

All the same, this author would like to present a picture of the man in his old age, his eyes myopic; his hands shot with veins. One would like to think it was faith that kept him going all those years, or the passion which led him to preach in the beginning. For faith can accomplish miraculous things; it can sustain, support, and hearten. That is, if you have a mind to let it.

[113] Jačov, Marko. Le Missioni Cattoliche.

WORKS CITED

Anderson, John. “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 1, 2007, pp. 185–201.

Balázs, Mihály. *Jesuit missions in Transylvania and Occupation: 1617-1625.* Scriptum, 1990.

Cemal, Kafadar. *Between Two Worlds*. Univ of California Press, 8 May 1995.

Chelaru, Rafael. “Between Coexistence and Assimilation-Catholic Identity and Islam in W. Balkans 17th-18th C.” Revista Istorică, vol. 23, no. 3-4, 2012.

Colak, Hasan. *Relations between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria: 16th-18th Centuries.* University of Birmingham, 2012.

Eugenia, Kermeli. “Marriage and Divorce of Christians and New Muslims in Early Modern Ottoman Empire: Crete 1645-1670.” Oriente Moderno, vol. 93, no. 2, 2013.

Greyerz, Kaspar. *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800*. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Gritten, David. “Iran Executes Two Men Convicted of Blasphemy.” BBC News, 8 May 2023. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65523996.

I. Kirill. “The Norm of Faith as a Norm of Life.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 Feb. 2000, www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-02-16/8_norma.html.

Ilyin, Ivan. A. *On Resistance to Evil by Forc*e. Zvolen, Slovakia: Taxiarch Press, 2018.

Inalcik, Halil, and Faroqhi, Suraiya. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300-1600*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

István, Tóth. “Between Islam and Catholicism: Bosnian Franciscan Missionaries in Turkish Hungary, 1584-1716.” *The Catholic Historical Review*, vol. 89, no. 3, 2003, pp. 409–433.

Kizilov, Mikhail. “Between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans. The Karaite and Rabbanite Jews of the Crimea in Early Modern Times.” Perspectives on the History of Karaism, edited by Guillaume Dye, Brussels, Éditions De l’Université De Bruxelles, 2021.

Krstić, Tijana. *Entangled Confessionalizations*? Gorgias Press, 2022.

Lancaster, Joseph. “The Turkish Century | from Hittites to Atatürk.” www.youtube.com, 26 Mar. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgjiJHV8P0w&t=2416s.

Marko, Jačov. *Le Missioni Cattoliche Nei Balcani Durante La Guerra Di Candia (1645-1669).* Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1992.

Molnár, Antal. “Struggle for the Chapel of Belgrade (1612—1643). Trade and Catholic Church in Ottoman Hungary.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, vol. 60, no. 1, 2007.

Muntan, Emese. “Between Rome and Constantinople: Franciscan Friars in Medieval and Ottoman Bosnia (13th-17th Centuries).” New Approaches towards a Comparative History of Religious Communities. Contributions from Eastern and Central Europe, FOVOG Workshop at Technische Universität Dresden, 22-23 November, 2016.

Mutan, Emese. “Uneasy Agents of Tridentine Reforms: Catholic Missionaries in Southern Ottoman Hungary and Their Local Competitors in the Early Seventeenth Century.” Journal of Early Modern Christianity, vol. 7, no. 1. 2020.

Murdock, Graeme. *Calvinism on the Frontier, 1600-1660.* Clarendon Press, 3 Aug. 2000.

Naar, E. Devin. “The ‘Mother of Israel’ or the ‘Sephardi Metropolis’? Sephardim, Ashkenazim, and Romaniotes in Salonica.” Jewish Social Studies 22, no. 1 (2016).

Payne, Daniel P. “Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?” Journal of Church and State, vol. 52, no. 4, 2010, pp.

Putin, Vladimir. *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*. July 12, 2021. Speech.

Putin, Vladimir. *Russia's National Security Concept*. 10 Jan. 2000, www.bits.de/EURA/natsecconc.pdf.

Rüpke, Jörge. *Religion and Its History*. Routledge, 9 May 2021.

Sekulić, Ana. "From a Legal Proof to a Historical Fact: Trajectories of an Ottoman Document in a Franciscan Monastery, Sixteenth to Twentieth Century." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 62, no. 5/6, 2019.

Shore, Paul. "The Life and Death of a Jesuit Mission: The Collegium in Uzhgorod, Transcarpathia (1650-1773)." The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 86, no. 4, 1 Oct. 2008.

Tas, Latif. "The Myth of the Ottoman "Millet" System: Its Treatment of Kurds and a Discussion of Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 21, no. 4, 2014, pp. 497–526,

Timothy E, Gregory. A History of Byzantium. Malden, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Tóth, István, Missionaries' *letters from Hungary and Transylvania*. Osiris Publishing, Budapest, 2004.